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Ability in various cognitive domains is often assessed by measuring task performance, such as the
accuracy of a perceptual categorization. A similar analysis can be applied to metacognitive reports
about a task to quantify the degree to which an individual is aware of his or her success or failure.
Here, we review the psychological and neural underpinnings of metacognitive accuracy, drawing on
research in memory and decision-making. These data show that metacognitive accuracy is dissoci-
able from task performance and varies across individuals. Convergent evidence indicates that the
function of the rostral and dorsal aspect of the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) is important for
the accuracy of retrospective judgements of performance. In contrast, prospective judgements of
performance may depend upon medial PFC. We close with a discussion of how metacognitive pro-
cesses relate to concepts of cognitive control, and propose a neural synthesis in which dorsolateral
and anterior prefrontal cortical subregions interact with interoceptive cortices (cingulate and insula)
to promote accurate judgements of performance.
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I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to
know myself, so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do
not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things.
Plato’s Phaedrus, 229E
1. INTRODUCTION
The notion that accurate self-knowledge has value, and
is something to strive for, has preoccupied thinkers
since Socrates. But, as the quotation from Plato illus-
trates, self-knowledge is not always (or even often)
evident, and at best tends to be a noisy and inaccurate
impression of one’s mental milieu [1]. Empirical work
in the psychological sciences has thrown up counterin-
tuitive examples of self-knowledge being confabulated,
dissociated from reality or otherwise inaccurate [2,3].
To take one striking case, when decisions about facial
attractiveness or supermarket goods are surreptitiously
reversed, subjects are often unaware of these reversals,
and go on to confabulate explanations of why they
chose options they had in fact rejected [4,5]. Further-
more, self-assessments of personality and cognitive
biasestendtobepoorer thansimilarassessmentsapplied
to others, leading to an ‘introspection illusion’ [6]. Such
subjectiveinaccuracyperhapsaccountsfor the demiseof
an introspectionist method in the late nineteenth cen-
tury: if verbal reports vary from setting to setting, and
can be contradicted from trial to trial, then what hope
is there for an objective science of the subjective? [7].
The very notion that an individualcanturn his or her
mental faculties inward was considered logically inco-
herent by Comte, who thought it paradoxical that the
mind might divide into two to permit self-observation
[8]. We now understand the brain as a network of
regions working in concert, and thus, it is perhaps
unsurprising that one set of regions (such as the pre-
frontal cortex: PFC) might process, hierarchically,
information arising from lower levels (such as primary
sensory regions). Indeed, several recent models of
local and large-scale brain function rely on hierarchy
as a principal organizing factor [9,10]. That self-
knowledge, and its accuracy, is under neural control is
supported by mounting evidence in the neuropsycholo-
gical literature, some of which will be reviewed later in
this article. For example, in cases of traumatic injury
to the frontal lobes, individuals may have deﬁcits in
self-knowledge of altered cognition and personality, as
measured by the discrepancy between reports from the
patient and family members [11]. Such studies have
focused on alterations in self-related, or autonoetic,
metacognition [12], but analogous discrepancies can
be measured in assessments of task performance in
healthy individuals.
By focusing on self-reports about memory
performance—metacognitive reports—Flavell provided
a systematic framework for the study of self-knowledge
in healthy individuals [13]. Here, the metacognitive
report is treated as an object of study in its own right,
and the accuracy of such reports (as dissociated from
accuracy, or performance, on the task itself) provide
an empirical scaffold upon which to build studies
of self-knowledge [14,15]. An inﬂuential model of
* Author for correspondence (ﬂeming.sm@gmail.com).
One contribution of 13 to a Theme Issue ‘Metacognition:
computation, neurobiology and function’.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2012) 367, 1338–1349
doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0417
1338 This journal is q 2012 The Royal Societymetacognition was developed to account for behaviour-
al dissociations between the ‘object’ level—cognition,
or, more correctly, task performance—and the ‘meta’
level, conceptualized as both monitoring and control-
ling the object level (ﬁgure 1;[ 17]). This approach
shares similarities with an inﬂuential model of executive
function [18]. The two-level framework has been
extended to study monitoring of perception [19,20],
decision-making [21,22], sense of agency [23] and
learning [24]. To the extent that the meta level imper-
fectly monitors the object level, self-reports about
cognition will be inaccurate, perhaps manifesting as a
lack of awareness of the object level [25].
Despiteprogressinthedeﬁnitionandmeasurementof
metacognition, the psychological and neural underpin-
nings of metacognitive accuracy remain ill understood
[16,26]. In this paper, we review different approaches
to eliciting metacognitive reports and quantifying their
accuracy,andconsiderpsychologicalandcomputational
explanations for dissociations between metacognitive
accuracy and task performance. We go on to consider
recent studies that apply convergent neuroscience
methodologies—functional and structural magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI), transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) and neuropsychological approaches—to
reveal cortical substrates mediating differences in meta-
cognitiveaccuracybothbetweenandwithinindividuals.
We end with a discussion of how metacognitive pro-
cesses relate to neuroscientiﬁc notions of cognitive
control, and propose a synthesis wherein dorsolateral
and anterior prefrontal cortical subregions interact
with interoceptive cortices (cingulate and insula) to
promote metacognitive accuracy.
2. MEASUREMENT OF METACOGNITION
There are several ﬂavours of metacognitive report, but
all share the elicitation of subjective beliefs about
cognition—how much do I know (viz. what can I
report) about ongoing task performance? In this section,
we review the behavioural methods available to the
researcher interested in metacognition, focusing primar-
ily on measures employed in the cognitive neuroscience
studies that are discussed in subsequent sections.
A ﬁrst distinction is that judgements can either be
prospective, occurring prior to performance of a
task, or retrospective, occurring after task completion
(table 1). In metamemory research, prospective judge-
ments include feelings of knowing (FOK) and
judgements of learning (JOL). A JOL elicits a belief
during learning about how successful recall will be
for a particular item on subsequent testing [27]. In
contrast, an FOK is a judgement about a different
aspect of memory, namely that of knowing the
answer to a particular question despite being unable
to explicitly recall it [28]. FOKs are usually studied
by ﬁrst asking the participants to recall answers to gen-
eral knowledge questions, and, for answers they cannot
recall, to predict whether they might be able to recog-
nize the answer from a list of alternatives. Related to
FOKs are tip-of-the-tongue states, in which an item
cannot be recalled despite a feeling that retrieval is
possible [29].
Retrospective reports can be similarly elicited by
asking the subject to give an additional report or com-
mentary over and above their initial forced-choice
response. For example, Peirce & Jastrow [30] asked
observers to rate their degree of conﬁdence in a
perceptual judgement using the following scale:
0 denoted absence of any preference for one answer
over its opposite, so that it seemed nonsensical to
answer at all. ‘1’ denoted a distinct leaning to one
alternative. ‘2’ denoted some little conﬁdence of
being right. ‘3’ denoted as strong a conﬁdence as one
would have about such sensations.
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Figure 1. (a) A schematic adapted from Shimamura [16] showing how the levels of Nelson and Narens’ cognitive psychology
modelofmetacognitioncanbenaturallymappedontoahierarchicalbrainstructure.(b)Theleftpanelshowsaﬁrst-order process,
such as a simple visual discrimination, that may occur in the absence of metacognitive report. The right panel shows the same
discrimination, this time with the information available for a second-order commentary about the decision.
Table 1. Summary of metacognitive measures classiﬁed by domain and time of elicitation. We note that a more general class
of prospective judgements is also possible that refers to cognitive abilities not tied to a particular task.
timing
object-level domain
memory decision-making sensory
prospective judgement of learning; feeling of knowing performance estimate n.a.
retrospective conﬁdence conﬁdence, wager visibility rating, conﬁdence
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in-accuracy has become a standard tool for eliciting
judgements of performance in a variety of settings
[24,31]. One potential problem with eliciting subjec-
tive conﬁdence is that of reliability: why should the
subject be motivated to reveal his or her true conﬁ-
dence, when there is little incentive to do so [32]? In
addition, the necessarily subjective instructions given
when eliciting reports of conﬁdence preclude the use
of these measures in non-human animal species. To
address these concerns, Kunimoto and colleagues
introduced wagers contingent on the correctness of
the decision as an intuitive measure of retrospective
conﬁdence [33,34]. In the simplest form of post-
decision wagering (PDW), a participant is asked to
gamble on whether their response was correct. If the
decision is correct, the wager amount is kept; if it is
incorrect, the amount is lost. The size of the chosen
gamble is assumed to reﬂect a subject’s conﬁdence in
his or her decision. In the same spirit as PDW, the Lot-
tery Rule aims to elicit true underlying decision
conﬁdence [35], and is similar to the Becker–De-
Groot–Marschak procedure used to elicit item values
in behavioural economics [36].
Once a metacognitive judgement is elicited, how
might we assess its accuracy? Again, several, often
complementary, methods are available. Metacognitive
accuracy is deﬁned by how closely metacognitive jud-
gements track ongoing task performance. Crucially,
therefore, all measures require that an independent
measure of the object level—task performance—is
acquired, in order to quantify the relationship between
the meta and object levels (ﬁgure 1). For example,
after asking for an FOK judgement, we might assess
whether the proportion of times a participant is
indeed able to recognize the correct, but hitherto
unrecalled, item from a list of alternatives. Then, by
plotting the strength of the JOL or FOK against objec-
tive memory performance (actual recall success for
JOLs, and recognition performance for FOKs), a
measure of metacognitive accuracy can be derived
from the associated correlation score [15]. Similar
conﬁdence-accuracy correlations can be computed
for retrospective conﬁdence judgements. If the
metacognitive report bears some relation to task per-
formance, then these correlation coefﬁcients will be
signiﬁcantly non-zero [37].
A related approach quantiﬁes the accuracy of meta-
cognitive assessments using the logic of signal
detection theory (SDT), which assesses how faithfully
an organism separates signal from noise [38,39]. In
standard applications of SDT (type 1), sensitivity is
deﬁned by how well an observer can discriminate an
objective state of the world (e.g. the presence or
absence of a stimulus; ﬁgure 2a). By applying similar
logic to metacognitive reports, the objective state of
the world becomes the subject’s trial-by-trial task per-
formance (correct or incorrect; ﬁgure 2a) and the
subjective report is now a judgement of that perform-
ance [40,41]. An advantage of the SDT approach is
that it dissociates bias from sensitivity: in other
words, measures of metacognitive accuracy are rela-
tively unaffected by an observer’s overall tendency to
use higher or lower conﬁdence ratings (ﬁgure 2b;
although see [42,43]). Further, it naturally connects
a process-level characterization of the relationship
between the object (type 1) and meta level (type 2)
to measures of behaviour, and this relationship can
type 1  ‘A’‘ B’‘ low’ ‘high’
S = A  hit  miss 
S = B  FA  CR 
type 2 
correct  hit  miss 
incorrect  FA  CR 
(a) (i)  (ii) 
(i) (ii)  (b) 
0.5
p(confidence | incorrect)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
(
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
|
 
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
)
1.0
0.5 
1.5 
3.0 
d¢ 
p(confidence | incorrect)
Figure 2. (a) Contingency tables for (i) type 1 SDT, and (ii) type 2 SDT. Rows correspond to objective states of the world;
columns correspond to subjects’ reports about the world; FA, false alarm; CR, correct rejection. In the type 2 table, ‘high’
and ‘low’ refer to decision conﬁdence. The linking arrow and colour scheme indicates that ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ states of
the world for the type 2 analysis are derived from averaging particular type 1 outcomes. (b) (i) Example of a type 2 receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) function for a single subject in a perceptual decision task where performance is held constant
using a staircase procedure. The shaded area indicates the strength of the relationship between performance and conﬁdence.
(ii) Theoretical type 2 ROC functions for different levels of type 1 d0 (assuming neutral type 1 response criteria) demonstrating
that metacognitive accuracy is predicted to increase as task performance increases.
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of metacognitive accuracy [44]. This generative aspect
of SDTwill be discussed further in a following section.
Before closing our discussion on measures of meta-
cognition, we note that a separate line of research
has assessed the extent to which humans and other
species use, or represent, uncertainty about the conse-
quences of their actions to optimize decision-making
(see [45,46] for reviews). To highlight one example,
Barthelme & Mamassian showed that when human
observers are allowed to choose between pairs of
visual stimuli upon which to carry out a task, they
systematically chose the less uncertain, thus improving
their performance [47]. Related work has demon-
strated that subjects use knowledge of uncertainty to
optimally bias decision-making in perceptual [48,49]
and motor [50] tasks, and that species as diverse as
dolphins, pigeons and monkeys can use an ‘opt-out’
response to improve their reward rate when decisions
are uncertain [51]. Recent single-neuron recording
studies have begun to outline candidate mechanisms
for a representation of uncertainty in the decision
system [52,53]. However, and crucially for the purpo-
ses of the present paper, use-of-uncertainty measures
do not dissociate metacognition from task perform-
ance on a trial-by-trial basis, and thus cannot be
used to study mechanisms underlying beliefs about
performance. For example, on each trial of the ‘opt-
out’ paradigm, the animal either chooses to complete
the task, or opt-out. On trials where the animal opts-
out (uses a ‘metacognitive’ response), we are unable
to measure performance, as no task is completed. On
trials where the animal does not opt-out, performance
measures are all we have. Thus, measures of metacog-
nitive accuracy cannot be computed based on pairwise
correlations between the two response types [54].
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF
METACOGNITIVE ACCURACY
In healthy individuals, metacognitive judgements are
usually predictive of subsequent or past task perform-
ance [55]. What, then, underlies this ability to know
that we know? On a direct-access view, metamemorial
judgements are based upon a survey of memory con-
tents, and thus draw upon the same information as a
subsequentrecognition or recallphase [28].Incontrast,
inferential accounts suggest that JOL, FOK and conﬁ-
dence judgements draw upon various mnemonic cues
that may only be partially related to the target [56]
(see [57] for a review). Such cues include the ﬂuency
or ease with which information is processed [58,59],
the accessibility or relatedness of cue information to
the target [60] and, for retrospective conﬁdence judge-
ments, the speed of a previous decision [17,61].
Becausetheavailablecuesmayonlybeindirectlyrelated
to the target, inferential accounts naturally accom-
modate dissociations between memory performance
and metacognitive accuracy; in contrast, direct-access
accounts predict a tight relationship between subjective
and objective indices of knowledge.
A complementary perspective on the antecedents of
metacognitive reports is provided by type 2 SDT. Con-
sider a perceptual decision task where post-decision
wagers are elicited to tap knowledge of task perform-
ance. Optimal wagering behaviour requires computing
the conditional probability of being correct given a pre-
vious choice [p(correctjchoice)] to decide whether to
wager high or low. There are various proposals as to
how this might be achieved [43,62]. In an echo of
direct-access accounts of metamemory discussed
above, most involve tracking the strength of the under-
lying evidence entering into the choice. Galvin and
colleagues [41] showed that the conditional probability
ofbeing corrector incorrectfora given decisionsignalis
a simple linear transformation of type 1 probability dis-
tributions. Similarly, in a dynamic situation, Vickers
[31]proposedthatdecisionconﬁdencecouldbederived
from the absolute distance between the winning and
losing integrators in an evidence accumulation frame-
work (see also [52]). Conﬁdence, therefore, is equated
with the difﬁculty of the decision in these approaches
[63,64]. Two corollaries arise from this ‘direct trans-
lation hypothesis’ [65]. First, given that conﬁdence
is equated with choice probability (as derived from
information governing choice), direct-translation
approaches cannotaccommodatedissociationsbetween
the object and meta level. Second, if both performance
and metacognitive judgements draw upon the same
information, metacognitive accuracy or the ability to
discriminate correct from incorrect decisions, always
increases as task performance itself increases. Impor-
tantly, both these hypotheses have been empirically
falsiﬁed: for the same level of task performance, judge-
ment conﬁdence may differ considerably between
conditions[66–68],and,whenperformanceisheldcon-
stantusingastaircaseprocedure,metacognitiveaccuracy
varies across individuals [21], and can be dissociated
from performance through pharmacological [69],
neural[20]andtask-based[70]manipulations(ﬁgure3).
Empirical dissociations between ﬁrst-order and
second-order components of decision-making have
prompted a search for models that can accommodate
such ﬁndings [71]. Recent models have been couched
in an ‘evidence accumulation’ framework, in which
samples of data are accumulated over time in order
to model the temporal evolution of a decision
[19,72,73]. Del Cul et al.[ 19] proposed a dual-route
evidence accumulation framework in which evidence
for behaviour (a forced-choice report of stimulus iden-
tity) and evidence for subjective report (visibility) were
accumulated separately. The ﬁt of this model could
account for the observed decoupling of subjective
reports from performance in patients with damage to
the PFC (see the study of Maniscalco & Lau [74]
for an alternative account). In a related approach,
Pleskac & Busemeyer [72] devised an evidence
accumulation scheme that could account for a wide
range of empirical regularities governing the relation-
ship between choice and conﬁdence ratings. The
solution here was to allow accumulation to continue
beyond the time at which the ﬁrst-order decision is
made. The same noisy accumulator is then accessed
to form the conﬁdence judgement at a later timepoint.
Interestingly, this model makes strong predictions
about post-decision neural activity in the parietal and
frontal cortices previously associated with pre-decision
evidence accumulation [75], and recent developments
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this and related hypotheses to be tested [76].
Despite being dissociable, metacognitive accuracy
does generally scale with task performance [33,77–
80]. Note that this regularity differs conceptually
from the fact that trial-by-trial judgements of conﬁ-
dence tend to correlate with performance; such
scaling is, after all, what measures of metacognitive
accuracy attempt to capture. Instead, it is the fact
that, between sessions, or individuals, metacognitive
accuracy itself covaries with performance on the task
(ﬁgure 2b). A tied relationship between performance
and metacognition presents a particular problem for
studies of the neural correlates of metacognitive abil-
ity: how are we to disentangle brain systems involved
in metacognition from those involved in performing
the task itself (cf. [81])? In the following section, we
keep this confound of performance in mind, and con-
sider the extent to which it is addressed by studies of
the neural basis of metacognitive accuracy.
4. NEURAL BASIS OF METACOGNITIVE
ACCURACY
(a) Studies of metamemory
Initial evidence regarding the neural basis of metacog-
nition was obtained from neuropsychological cases
[82]. Hirst and colleagues suggested that metamemory
might be impaired in patients with Korsakoff’s syn-
drome, a neurological disorder characterized by
severe anterograde amnesia that occurs as a result of
chronic alcohol abuse and nutritional deﬁciency
[83]. Structural brain changes in Korsakoff’s include
increases in cerebrospinal ﬂuid and severe volume
loss in the orbitofrontal cortices and thalamus [84].
Shimamura & Squire [85] found that Korsakoff’s
patients have a selective impairment in the accuracy
of FOK judgements compared with an amnesic con-
trol group, despite being equated on recognition
memory performance. These ﬁndings suggested that
metamemory impairment is due to damage in brain
regions other than medial temporal lobe and
diencephalic midline structures associated with amne-
sia. In line with this hypothesis, subsequent studies
found that non-amnesic patients with frontal lobe
damage also exhibit poor metamemory accuracy (e.g.
[86]; see [87] for a review).
While implicating frontal lobe structures in metacog-
nitive accuracy, these early studies lacked anatomical
speciﬁcity. Using lesion overlap measurements, Schnyer
and colleagues found that damage to the right ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) was associated
withdecreasedFOKaccuracybutintactconﬁdencejud-
gements, suggesting a possible dissociation between
brain systems supporting different classes of metame-
morial judgements [88]( table 1). Patients in Schnyer
et al.’s study also showed deﬁcits in memory perform-
ance, but impairment in FOK accuracy could not be
explained by these changes in performance alone. In
support of a selective role for medial PFC in FOK jud-
gements, patients with lesion overlap in the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) who were matched in
recognition performance to a control group showed a
selective FOK deﬁcit, despite intact conﬁdence judge-
ments [79]. The reverse dissociation was reported by
Pannu etal.[89],whofoundthatdeﬁcitsinretrospective
conﬁdence judgements were predominantly associa-
ted with lateral frontal lesions. As we discuss below,
together this evidence suggests that prospective judge-
ments are supported by medial PFC function, whereas
retrospective judgements depend on lateral PFC.
Complementary functional brain imaging studies
have shown that regions in the medial and lateral PFC
are active during metamemorial judgements, with
activity in PFC modulated by both prospective and ret-
rospective conﬁdence judgements [90–94]. VMPFC
(peak Montreal Neurological Institute coordinate: 23,
30, 218) showed greater activity during accurate
FOK judgements, and increased connectivity with
medial temporal lobe memory structures in the FOK
condition compared with a low-level control task [95].
Complementing this work, individual differences in
metacognitive accuracy for prospective JOLs correlated
with VMPFC activity (peak: 211, 42, 226) on
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Figure 3. Data from a visual decision task demonstrating a dissociation of metacognitive accuracy from task performance. Sub-
jects made a visual decision (either an orientation or contrast judgement) and then provided a retrospective conﬁdence rating.
A measure of metacognitive accuracy was derived from these ratings by calculating the area under the type 2 ROC function.
Performance on the orientation judgement task did not predict task performance on the contrast judgement task (a). However,
metacognitive accuracy was strongly correlated between tasks (b), suggesting that it is both independent of task performance
and stable within individuals. Reproduced with permission from Song et al.[ 70].
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differences were not explained by individual differences
in memory performance.
(b) Retrospective conﬁdence judgements in
psychophysics
Other studies have begun to harness the methods of
psychophysics to tightly clamp or adjust for differences
in performance while simultaneously studying
metacognition and its neural substrates (ﬁgure 4).
As an example of this approach, Lau and Passing-
ham matched performance between two visual
masking conditions, but found differences in threshold
for metacognitive commentaries about the stimulus
(‘seen’ responses) that were associated with activity
in left dorsolateral PFC [67] (dlPFC; peak: 246, 48,
14). Conﬁrming a causal role for PFC in subjective
report threshold, patients with lesions to rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex (rlPFC, BA10) have an increased
threshold for producing metacognitive commentaries
about a stimulus compared with controls, despite
objective performance being matched between
groups [19]. The peak correlation between lesion
and decrease in subjective report threshold was seen
in left BA10 (peak: 232, 54, 26).
Taking an individual differences approach, Fleming
et al. [21] constrained perceptual decision performance
to be near-threshold (71%) through use of a staircase
procedure,whilecollectingretrospectiveconﬁdencerat-
ings. Considerable variation in metacognitive accuracy
(using type 2 SDT analysis) was found despite task
performance remaining constant across individuals.
Through use of structural brain imaging, this variance
inmetacognitiveaccuracywasshowntopositivelycorre-
late with grey matter volume in right rlPFC (BA10;
peak: 24, 65, 18; ﬁgure 4a), and greater metacognitive
accuracy was associated with increased white matter
integrity (fractional anisotropy) in a region of the
corpus callosum known to project to the rlPFC [97].
Such ﬁndings are consistent with individual differences
in localized brain structure affecting a region’s
functional properties [98]. In a complementary study
using functional MRI, subjects performed a visual
working-memory test and provided retrospective
conﬁdence ratings. Metacognitive accuracy as deter-
mined by the gamma statistic correlated with the level
of activity in right posterior-lateral BA10 [96] (peak:
16, 56, 28), despite being uncorrelated with task
performance (ﬁgure 4b).
While correlational analyses can reveal candidate
brain regions mediating metacognitive accuracy, con-
ﬁrmation of their necessity ultimately requires
intervention studies. By applying repetitive TMS to
temporarily inactivate bilateral dlPFC, Rounis et al.
[20] selectively decreased metacognitive accuracy
while leaving performance on a perceptual task unaf-
fected. Further, by explicitly modelling the link
between type 1 and type 2 responses [44], they were
able to show that dlPFC TMS decreased metacogni-
tive accuracy below that expected from a direct-
translation account alone (ﬁgure 4c). Taken together,
these studies provide convergent evidence that rostro-
lateral aspects of PFC (BA10/46) play a mediating role
in the accuracy of retrospective commentaries.
A role for rlPFC in metacognition is consistent with
its anatomical position at the top of the cognitive hier-
archy, receiving information from other prefrontal
cortical regions, cingulate and anterior temporal
cortex [99]. Further, compared with non-human pri-
mates, rlPFC has a sparser spatial organization that
may support greater interconnectivity [100]. The con-
tribution of rlPFC to metacognitive commentary may
be to represent task uncertainty in a format suitable for
communication to others, consistent with activation
here being associated with evaluating self-generated
information [101,102], and attention to internal rep-
resentations [103]. Such a conclusion is supported
by recent evidence from structural brain imaging that
‘reality monitoring’ and metacognitive accuracy share
a common neural substrate in anterior PFC [104].
In contrast, dlPFC may maintain information about
a previous decision, consistent with its role in working
memory [105,106]. However, in comparison with, for
example, parietal cortex [107], reliable cytoarchitec-
tonic boundaries are not yet established for human
rlPFC [108]. Indeed, activations ascribed to either lat-
eral rlPFC or dlPFC in this review cluster around a
transition zone between BA10 and BA46 [96,109];
thus, it is unclear whether they arise from a single
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Figure 4. Convergent evidence for a role of rostrolateral PFC in metacognitive accuracy. (a) Across individuals, grey matter
volume in rlPFC was found to positively correlate (hot colours) with metacognitive accuracy (type 2 ROC area) after control-
ling for differences in task performance [21]. (b) In a complementary study, BOLD signal in right posterior-lateral BA10 was
positively correlated with metacognitive accuracy (gamma) but not differences in task performance [96]. (c) The necessity of
lateral PFC for metacognitive accuracy was conﬁrmed by combining TMS with SDT: following repetitive TMS to bilateral
dlPFC, subjects exhibited reduced meta-d0 (the type 2 d0 expected from a given level of type 1 sensitivity) despite intact
task performance [20]. Panels reproduced with permission from [21,96,20].
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different functions. Single-subject analyses [110]m a y
aid in solving this puzzle.
(c) Nature of individual differences
Harnessing individual differences can provide leverage
on the neural correlates of metacognitive accuracy
[21,78,96]. Such studies implicitly assume intra-
personal stability of metacognitive capacity. However,
in the metamemory literature, evidence for a stable
metacognitive ability is surprisingly weak [111,112].
Given the interdependence of metacognition and per-
formance discussed above, one explanation for this
null result might be methodological in nature, as a per-
formance-conﬁdence relationship is naturally harder
to quantify than performance itself. A similar line of
thought led Keleman et al. to speculate that ‘stable
metacognitive performance might be detected using
very large numbers of trials’ [112]. In support of this
view, Fleming et al. showed good split-half reliability
(r ¼ 0.69) in a perceptual decision task with hundreds
of trials [21], and metacognitive accuracy has been
shown to be stable across two perceptual tasks (r ¼
0.71), despite performance itself being uncorrelated
(r ¼ 0.05; ﬁgure 3)[ 70]. An important unanswered
question is whether metacognitive accuracy is stable
across domain (e.g. memory and decision-making),
as might be predicted by their overlapping neural
substrates [113].
(d) Summary
There is now considerable evidence that damage to the
PFC selectively affects the accuracy of metacognitive
reports while leaving task performance relatively
intact. Intriguingly, there is some evidence for a
lateral–medial separation between neural systems sup-
porting retrospective conﬁdence judgements and
prospective judgements of performance, respectively.
The role of ventromedial PFC in prospective judge-
ments of performance may be explained by its strong
connections with medial temporal lobe memory
structures and its role in imagination of the future
[114,115]. In contrast, the role of anterior and dorso-
lateral PFC in retrospective judgements of conﬁdence
may be more closely aligned to that of a performance
monitor, integrating and maintaining information per-
taining to the immediately preceding decision to
facilitate accurate metacognitive commentary. In the
next section, we focus in greater detail on perform-
ance-monitoring functions to illustrate connections
between metacognition and a separate but substantial
literature on the neuroscience of cognitive control.
5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METACOGNITION
AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
An inﬂuential suggestion is that decision-making
systems should be sensitive to the current level of
conﬂict between possible responses to mobilize
additional ‘cognitive control’ resources in an adaptive
fashion [116]. Activity in ACC and anterior insula is
increased during heightened response conﬂict (see
[117,118] for reviews), whereas lateral PFC activity
correlates with behavioural adjustments, such as
increased caution, following high-conﬂict trials
[119,120]. Further, the ACC is suggested to recruit lat-
eral PFC to increase levels of control when conﬂict
occurs [117]. This proposal for a cognitive control
loop shares obvious similarities with concepts of
monitoring and control in metacognition research
(ﬁgure 1); indeed, a previous review proposed metacog-
nition might be commensurate with cognitive control
[121]. However, such a view would predict that any
system with the capacity for monitoring and control
has metacognitive representations, which is not usually
heldtobethecase.Instead,philosophershavediscussed
and debated two ‘levels’ of metacognition [122]: one
involving declarative (conscious) meta-representation
[123];theotherlow-level,basedonnon-verbalepistemic
feelings of uncertainty [124,125]. For present purposes,
we consider monitoring processes as metacognitive to
the extent they are consciously reportable, and thus
available for deployment outside of a ‘closed-loop’
optimization of the task at hand (see also [126]). Such
reports can be empirically dissociated from monitoring
and control: for example, skilled typists show subtle
post-error adjustments in the absence of awareness,
and yet accept blame for errors that are surreptitiously
insertedbytheexperimentersonthescreen[127]. Inter-
estingly,subjectiveeffectsofheighteneddecisionconﬂict
may themselves be reportable in the absence of aware-
ness of antecedents of this conﬂict [128], and thus it
is not always simple to decide whether performance
monitoring involves meta-representation.
What might govern the accessibility of performance-
monitoring information to awareness? We suggest that
rlPFC is particularly important for the representation
of information pertaining to a previous decision in a
globally accessible frame of reference. In a direct com-
parison of conﬁdence judgements following mnemonic
and perceptual decisions, both ACC and right dlPFC
activity increased with decreasing conﬁdence [113];
however, only right dlPFC encoded conﬁdence inde-
pendent of changes in reaction time, leading the
authors to suggest that while ACC responds to online
decision conﬂict, dlPFC activity underlies the selection
of metacognitive responses. Furthermore, a recent
study found that activity in rlPFC both increases
during metacognitive reports and correlates with
reported conﬁdence [109]. Thus, the accuracy of
metacognitive commentaries, as dissociated from
adjustments in performance, might be governed by
the ﬁdelity with which rlPFC integrates and maintains
information from cingulate and insula involved in
online adjustments in task performance, consistent
with reciprocal anatomical connections between these
regions [129].
If only a subset of nodes in this network is present,
one might ﬁnd effective performance monitoring in
the absence of metacognition. This pattern of results
was observed in a patient with a large left prefrontal
cortical lesion, who displayed intact performance adjust-
ments in the Stroop task, without being able to report
changes in the subjective sense of effort while perform-
ing the task [130]. As the patient displayed intact
conﬂict-related N2 event-related potential responses
during the Stroop task, the authors suggested that
(implicit) monitoring and control is maintained by an
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would normally be mediated by the damaged lateral
PFC. Such a conclusion is supported by recent evidence
that lateral PFC activity is higher in subjects with a
strong tendency to avoid cognitively demanding
decisions [131]. Importantly for our hypothesis, if
lateral PFC receives input from non-conscious monitor-
ing loops, the reverse dissociation would not be
p r e d i c t e d :w em i g h tb ea b l et oc o n t r o lo b j e c t sw e
cannot report, but should not be able report upon
objects we cannot (cognitively) control.
The respective roles of nodes in this network remain
to be determined, but there is initial evidence for
division of labour. TMS to dlPFC impairs metacogni-
tion following correct but not incorrect decisions,
suggesting a role in representing conﬁdence rather
than monitoring for errors [20]. In contrast, reporting
of response errors has been linked to the error-related
positivity [132] with a possible source in insula cortex
[118]. Indeed, accurate metacognitive commentaries
about performance require access to information
about both beliefs and responses. For example, just
after hitting a shot in tennis, you might have high con-
ﬁdence (low uncertainty) that the spot you chose to
aim at is out of reach of your opponent (your belief),
but low conﬁdence in correctly executing the shot
(your response). Thus, for commentaries to integrate
information both about a belief and response, the
‘frame of reference’ in which information is encoded
is crucial. If information is maintained in segregated
sensorimotor loops, performance adjustments could
be made based on deviations from an expected trajec-
tory without this information being more generally
availablefor,say,verbalreport.Itremainsanopenques-
tion as to the extent to which decision-making relies
on ‘embodied’ or domain-general circuitry [133], but
a role for the PFC in the abstract encoding of
decision-related information, independent of response
modality, has been found using fMRI conjunction ana-
lyses [134,135]. It will be of interest to test whether this
same activity is involved in metacognition.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Cognitive psychology has developed a rich theoretical
framework and empirical tools for studying self-
assessments of cognition. A crucial variable of interest
is the accuracy of metacognitive reports with respect to
their object-level targets: in other words, how well do
we know our own minds? We now understand meta-
cognition to be under segregated neural control, a
conclusion that might have surprised Comte, and
one that runs counter to an intuition that we have ver-
idical access to the accuracy of our perceptions,
memories and decisions. A detailed, and eventually
mechanistic, account of metacognition at the neural
level is a necessary ﬁrst step to understanding the fail-
ures of metacognition that occur following brain
damage [87] and psychiatric disorder [136]. In this
paper, we summarized a variety of behavioural
approaches for measuring the accuracy of metacogni-
tive assessments, and reviewed the possible neural
substrates of metacognitive accuracy in humans. We
conclude that there are potentially separable brain
systems for prospective and retrospective judgements
of performance, and our synthesis of recent neuropsy-
chological and brain imaging ﬁndings implicates the
rostrolateral PFC as crucial in mediating retrospective
judgements of cognition. In this model, the rostrolat-
eral PFC receives input from interoceptive cortex
involved in ‘closed-loop’ monitoring and control, gen-
erating a metacognitive representation of the state of
the system that can be deployed or reported outside
of the current task at hand.
We close with a number of open questions we hope
will be addressed by future studies:
— To what extent does metacognitive accuracy (and
its associated neural correlates) generalize across
different object-level domains?
— To what extent does metacognition rely on abstract
(response-independent) decision variables?
— Are the neural correlates of error-monitoring and
conﬁdence separable [71]?
— Do dlPFC (BA46) and rlPFC (BA10) make
differential contributions to metacognition?
— If task performance can be monitored and cor-
rected in the absence of metacognitive report,
what is the functional role of metacognitive
(in)accuracy?
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